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I. Contract Interpretation 
Recent decisions have brought about a number of changes 
in the area of contract interpretation. Although the general 
trends seem clear and commendable, the details are often ob-
scure and bothersome. 
Whatever was left of the "face-of-the-document" approach 
to parol evidence rule problems in California was buried in 
1968.1 The trial court must now learn the nature of the ex-
trinsic evidence before it can properly rule on its admissibility.2 
No written instrument can be interpreted or labeled clear and 
unambiguous until all circumstances surrounding its execution 
are known and considered.s 
The requirement that a trial court may not exclude extrinsic 
evidence out of hand but must consider its nature to determine 
its admissibility is not a new legal proposition.4 What is 
rather different about the recent California decisions are di-
rectives such as the following: "Evidence of oral collateral 
agreements should be excluded only when the fact finder is 
likely to be misled. The rule must therefore be based on the 
credibility of the evidence. One such standard, adopted by 
section 240 (1 )( b) of the Restatement of Contracts, permits 
proof of a collateral agreement if it is such an agreement as 
might naturally be made as a separate agreement by parties 
situated as were the parties to the written contract.,,5 "The 
1. Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal.2d 222, 
65 Cal. Rptr. 545, 436 P.2d 561 (1968). 
2. Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal.2d 222, 
65 Cal. Rptr. 545, 436 P.2d 561 (1968); 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v G. W. 
Thomas Drayage & Rigging Company, 
69 Ca1.2d 33, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 442 
P.2d 641 (1968). 
3. Estate of Russell, 69 Cal.2d 200, 
70 Cal. Rptr. 561; 444 P.2d 353 (1968); 
Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto, 69 Cal. 
2d 525, 72 Cal. Rptr. 785, 446 P.2d 
785 (1968). 
4. See, for example, Restatement of 
Contracts § 240(1)(b). 
S. Masterson v. Sine, 68 Cal.2d 222, 
474 
227. The fiction that the parol evi-
dence rule rests on the presumed intent 
of the parties to omit from the writing 
certain terms discussed during prior ne-
gotiations seems to have been displaced. 
The Masterson fiction seems to hold that 
the exclusion of parol evidence is pred-
icated on the lack of credibility of the 
parties' recollections concerning oral, 
as distinguished from simply extrinsic, 
terms. A prior or contemporaneous ex-
trinsic term need not have been oral. 
Whether it was oral or written would 
appear to have little or no bearing on 
the question whether the parties might 
naturally have left it in a collateral 
form. Yet the written extrinsic term 
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test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the mean-
ing of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the 
court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether 
the offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which 
the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible."a 
An analysis of Delta Dynamics, Inc. v. Arioto7 may offer 
some guidance to the future direction of the law in this area. 
If nothing else, the case certainly indicates that the issues are 
not settled. The plaintiff developed a safety device for fire-
arms and contracted with the defendants for distribution and 
sale throughout the United States. Defendants expressly prom-
ised to sell a certain number each year, and the contract pro-
vided that should it fail to do so, the agreement would be sub-
ject to termination by plaintiff. Defendant did not meet his 
quota, and plaintiff terminated the agreement and sued for 
damages for defendant's failure to purchase the first year's 
quota. Defendant contended that termination was intended 
to be plaintiff's sole remedy. During the trial, defendant's 
counsel asked one of his clients: "During the negotiations 
that culminated in the execution of this contract between your 
company and Delta Dynamics, was there any conversion or 
discussion as to what would happen as far as (defendant) is 
concerned if they failed to meet the minimum quota set up in 
that contract?"8 An objection on the basis of the parol evi-
dence rule was sustained, and no offer of proof was made. 
The trial court gave judgment for the plaintiff. It was reversed. 
As in the above-quoted cases, the majority opinion was 
written by Chief Justice Traynor. The opinion finds that de-
fendant's express promise to sell a given quota clearly implied 
a promise to purchase that number from plaintiff and that 
would presumably be the more credible 
and the less likely of the two to "mis-
lead the fact finder." The Masterson 
opinion treats credibility and what might 
naturally have been left out of the writ-
ten contract as analogous approaches. 
It does not appear to this writer that 
they are. 
6. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. G. 
CAL LAW 1970 
W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 
69 Cal.2d 33, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 442 
P.2d 641 (1968). 
7. 69 Cal.2d 525, 72 Cal. Rptr. 785, 
446 P.2d 785 (1968); modified 69 AC 
859. 
8. 69 Cal.2d 525, 527, 529, 72 Cal. 
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"[n]ormally the breach of such a promise would give rise to 
an action for damages."9 The Court found, however, that the 
termination clause could have been intended to spell out with 
specificity the condition on which Delta could terminate the 
contract or could have been intended to set forth the exclusive 
remedy which was to be available to Delta. Since the lan-
guage was "fairly susceptible of either one of the two interpre-
tations contended for"10 the trial court was held to have com-
mitted reversible error in sustaining the objection to the de-
fendant's question. 
One of the more significant aspects of the dissent in this 
case is the identity of its author. In Masterson v. Sinell and 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Company v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & 
Rigging Company/2 Justice Mosk joined in the majority of the 
five-to-two· decision. He authored the dissent in the four-to-
three decision of Delta Dynamics which contains the follow-
ing: "Although I had misgivings at the time, I must confess to 
joining the majority in both of those cases. [Masterson and 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co.]. Now, however, that the majority 
deem negotiations leading to execution of contracts admis-
sible, the trend has become so mistakenly ominous that I must 
urge a halt."13 In light of the prospective change in member-
ship of the court,14 it seems fair to speculate that additional 
words may yet be forthcoming on the subject. 
The differences in the positions of the Traynor and Mosk 
opinions on the extrinsic evidence issue in Delta Dynamics 
may not be as great as they appear on the surface. The Mosk 
opinion emphasizes the point that the question that the trial 
court found to be objectionable specified "during the negotia-
tions. ,,15 (Emphasis by the Court). The majority 
opinion notes that the pretrial conference order raised the is-
9. 69 Cal.2d 525, 529, 72 Cal. Rptr. 13. 69 Cal.2d 525, 531,72 Cal. Rptr. 
785, 787, 446 P.2d 785, 788. 785, 789, 446 P.2d 785, 789. 
10. 69 Cal.2d 525, 528, 72 Cal. Rptr. 14. The Retirement of Chief Justice 
785, 787, 446 P.2d 785, 787. Traynor. 
11. 68 Cal.2d 222, 65 Cal. Rptr. 15. 69 Cal.2d 525, 529, 72 Cal. Rptr. 
545, 436 P.2d 561 (1968). 785, 787, 446 P.2d 785, 787. 
12. 69 Cal.2d 33, 69 Cal. Rptr. 561, 
442 P.2d 641 (1968). 
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sue of the meaning of the cancellation clause and contends 
that ".. [T]he substance, purpose and relevance of the 
offered evidence was known to the court, and no more com-
plete offer or proof was required."ls From this, it would 
appear that Delta Dynamics need not be interpreted as author-
izing introduction of all negotiations that led to a written con-
tract, as the dissenting opinion suggests. It may have merely 
repeated the Pacific Gas & Electric Co. position that extrinsic 
agreements or understandings can be considered where the 
language of the writing is justly susceptible to either of the two 
interpretations for which the parties contend. 
There were a number of decisions from the Courts of Ap-
peal in this area. What would formerly have been a proper 
exclusion of parol evidence was found to be error;17 what 
might have appeared to be unwarranted reliance on parol evi-
dence was found to be proper. IS And where separate consid-
eration existed to support a finding that a true collateral agree-
ment or contract existed, that agreement was enforceable in 
its own right.19 
II. Illegality 
The defense of illegality was raised in a variety of fact set-
tings in recent cases. The results were mixed. 
The Third District Court of Appeal decided two cases in-
volving debts allegedly arising in connection with gambling 
activities. In Lane & Pyron, Inc. v. Gibbs,20 the assignee of 
the owners of duly licensed Nevada gambling casinos sought 
to enforce payment of checks which the casinos had honored 
and which had been returned for lack of sufficient funds. 
Prior Nevada cases have denied enforcement of gambling 
16. 69 Cal.2d 525, 527, fn.l, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 786, fn.1, 446 P.2d 786, fn.t. 
17. Connell v. Zaid, 268 Cal. App.2d 
788, 74 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1969); Estrada 
v. Darling-Crose Machine Co., 275 Cal. 
App. -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1969). 
18. Davidson v. Welch, 270 Cal. App. 
2d 220, 75 Cal. Rptr. 676 (1969). For 
CAL LAW 1970 
further discussion of this case, see 
Moreau, TORTS, in this volume. 
19. Wright v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 
274 Cal. App. -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 12 
(1969). 
20. 266 Cal. App. 2d 61, 71 Cal. 
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debts! and a prior California decision denied recovery on a 
check cashed by the owner of a casino at the gaming tables.! 
The Lane case, however, involved checks cashed at cashier's 
cages in gambling casinos. The casinos offered food, liquor, 
entertainment, and hotel rooms in addition to gambling op-
portunities, and the defendant was admittedly free to "walk 
out" with the money. However, the uncontradicted evidence 
produced by the defense was that the defendant lost all of the 
funds gambling at the particular casino that cashed each 
check. The judgment for the plaintiff was reversed. 
In the Lane case there were no findings of fact. The Court 
of Appeal noted, however, that under the new Evidence Code 
the presumption of legality is not evidence,s and concluded 
that there was no substantial evidence from which the trial 
court could have avoided finding that the checks were cashed 
for the purpose of providing funds to gamble with the "donor.,,4 
Bristow v. Morelli5 involved a plaintiff who was a patron 
at a licensed card room and a defendant who owned and op-
erated the establishment. Defendant acted as banker and sold 
chips but did not participate in the draw poker game. At 
defendant's request, plaintiff "cashed in" a quantity of chips 
during the course of an evening in exchange for defendant's 
note. At the conclusion of the evening, plaintiff received de-
fendant's oral promise to pay the value of plaintiff's remain-
ing chips. 
The Court affirmed a judgment in favor of plaintiff on these 
obligations, noting that these obligations were not gaming 
debts, they were not loans made for the purpose of enabling 
either party to gamble, and the defendant was not a partic-
ipant in the gambling activities which were being conducted. 
1. Wolpert v. Knight, 74 Nev. 322, 
330 P.2d 1023 (1958). 
2. Hamilton v. Abadjian, 30 Cal.2d 
49, 179 P.2d 804 (1947). 
3. Evid. Code § 600(a); Lane & Py-
ron, Inc. v. Gibbs, 266 Cal. App.2d 61, 
65, 71 Cal. Rptr. 817, 819. 
4. The location of the cashier's cage, 
478 
the fact that the defendant had been 
flown to Nevada on a so-called gam-
bler's flight, the fact that the defendant 
had just left the gambling tables and 
returned directly to them, and other 
facts peculiar to this case no doubt in-
fluenced the Court's determination. 
5. 270 Cal. App.2d 894, 76 Cal. Rptr. 
203 (1969). 
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These factors were held to distinguish Bristow from the Lane 
case. 
It would appear that advancing cash in the form of loans 
or cashing checks under circumstances where it is apparent 
that the funds are likely to be used for gambling may result in 
an unenforceable obligation. Lane involved the additional 
element that the party cashing the checks was the party with 
whom the check writer intended to gamble. It is not clear 
whether this is a necessary element for denying enforceability 
of the obligation. 
Section 7031 of the Business & Professional Code requires 
a contractor to plead and prove the fact that he was licensed in 
order to enforce a construction contract. In Pickens v. Amer-
ican Mortgage Exchange6 an unlicensed contractor brought 
action for the tort of fraud, alleging, inter alia, that the defend-
ants fraudulently induced plaintiffs to enter the construction 
contracts and fraudulently induced them to perform work 
thereon. The Court held that, while section 7031 barred re-
covery in contract because of the implied illegality of plain-
tiffs' performance as an unlicensed contractor, it did not bar 
recovery for tort, and the summary judgment for defendants 
was reversed. 
While one must agree that there is a distinction between 
contract and tort theories of recovery, it would seem fair to 
note that the apparent purpose of section 7031 is neatly 
avoided. However, the case was not without precedent.7 
The right to receive restitution for benefits conferred pursu-
ant to an illegal contract was again raised in Griffis v. Squire.8 
Quoting from Norwood v. Judd, a 1949 case,9 the Griffis 
Court noted that restitution has been granted where: (1) the 
transaction is complete; (2) no serious moral turpitude is in-
volved; (3) the defendant bears the greater moral fault, and 
( 4) unjust enrichment would result from denial of restitution. 
6. 269 Cal. App.2d 299, 74 Cal. 154 (1968). For further discussion of 
Rptr. 788 (1969). this case, see York, REMEDIES in this 
7. Grant v. Weatherholt, 123 Cal. volume. 
App.2d 34, 266 P.2d 185 (1954). 9. 93 Cal. App.2d 276, 209 P.2d 24 
8. 267 Cal. App.2d 461, 73 Cal. Rptr. (1949). 
CAL LAW 1970 479 
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In Griffis, however, the Court expressly conceded that there 
was no finding that defendant was guilty of the greater moral 
fault, and it was quite evident from the facts that this was not 
the case. Despite this factor, the Court concluded that resti-
tution was a proper remedy, citing Hainey v. Narigon. 10 The 
apparent test to be applied is simply whether the forfeiture re-
sulting from nonenforcement of the contract is disproportion-
ately harsh, considering the nature of the illegality involved. 
An unreported decision of the Third District Court of Ap-
pealll would sharply restrict the application of the Subdivision 
Lands Act.12 Plaintiff vendor had engaged in more than five 
transactions over a period of years with respect to a single 
parcel of property by selling and encumbering various parts 
of it. Defendant vendee had contracted to purchase approx-
imately 10 acres, which constituted a substantial portion of 
the remaining property. That vendor had given no notice to 
the Real Estate Commissioner and had obtained no public re-
port was advanced by the defendant as an illegal act within the 
meaning of the act. 
In affirming a trial court holding that the contract was en-
forceable, the Court stated: "[Vendor] never subdivided his 
property into lots or homes for sale to the public and [vendee], 
as a buyer of the major part of [vendor's] remaining land, was 
not a member of the buying public whom the subdivision law 
aimed to protect. The isolated and disconnected transactions 
by [vendor] did not make him a subdivider or subject any of 
his transactions, . . . to the subdivision law."13 
III. Statute of Frauds 
Detrimental reliance on an oral contact within the statute of 
frauds has been recognized in some fact situations as a basis 
10. 247 Cal. App.2d 528, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 638 (1966). 
11. Tougerousse v. Koshell, 3 Civ. 
No. 12,093 and 12,094; Hearing denied. 
See generally Rule 976 (b)(c) California 
Rules of Court (standard of publica-
480 
tion). See also 39 S. Cal. L. Rev. 608 
(1966). 
12. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 11000 et. 
seq. 
13. Opinion, 3 Civ. No. 12,093, dat-
ed October 31, 1969, p. 11. 
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for enforcing the oral contract,14 but the problem remains as 
to what reliance must be shown. In Carlson v. Richardson,16 
vendee in an action for specific performance of an oral con-
tract to sell a coastal homesite relied on vendor's assurance of 
performance over a period of three years, and in doing so 
"passed up opportunities" to buy other land. The Court re-
jected the contention that loss of the bargain and loss of op-
portunities to buy other property in a rising market were the 
type of detrimental reliance that would suffice to remove the 
agreement from the shelter of the statute. However, purchase 
of a nearby property contemplated for use as a temporary 
residence while a house was to be built on the disputed prop-
erty might constitute such a detriment. The Court held that 
the issue should have been submitted to the trier of fact. 
Fellom v. Adams16 involved an action to enforce a note 
given to a real estate agent for the balance of the commission 
promised under an oral broker's contract. The Court affirmed 
the holding that the moral obligation arising from a promise 
unenforceable due to the statute of frauds furnishes adequate 
consideration for a promissory note or other written promise 
to pay. 
IV. Assignments 
The 1957 case of Fricker v. Uddo & Taormina CO. 17 in-
volved a tomato grower who had assigned to the plaintiff a 
right to receive moneys due to the grower from the defendant 
canning company. Here it was held that the general rule that 
rights of an assignee cannot be destroyed by payments made 
by the debtor to the assignor after notice of assignment will 
not be applied where such payments are necessary to secure 
assignor's performance. The defendant canner in Fricker was 
allowed to make advances to the grower in order to insure pro-
14. See, for example, Monarco v. Lo 
Greco, 35 Cal.2d 621, 220 P.2d 737 
(1950); Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 
782, 106 P. 88 (1909). 
15. 267 Cal. App.2d 204, 72 Cal. 
Rptr. 769 (1968). For further discus-
CAL LAW 1970 
sion of this case, see York, REMEDIES, 
in this volume. 
16. 274 Cal. App.2d -, 79 Cal. 
Rptr. 633 (1969). 
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duction of the crop even after assignee asserted his right to 
receive payment. In Hoover v. Agriform Chemical Co./8 
extension of the Fricker rule was denied. The debtor, Agri-
form, made periodic advances to the assignor, its local dis-
tributor, which were necessary to keep the assignor "afloat." 
As a result of these advances, the distributor was constantly 
in debt to Agriform and no moneys were ever paid to Mr. 
Hoover, the assignee of a portion of the commissions that the 
distributor earned. 
The Court held that the Fricker case rule would apply only 
where the advances to the assignor are necessary to perform 
a particular contract that is to produce the right to the funds 
that were assigned. "It does not encompass subsequent ad-
vances of a general nature to a going business engaged in 
many transactions over a period of years . . . "19 
In St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. James I. Barnes 
Constr. Co./o the Fricker case and others were cited as author-
ity for the statement:" . when the existence of the 
assigned fund is dependent upon performance by the assignor 
of an executory contract, the anticipatory debtor may do 
whatever reasonably appears to be necessary to enable the as-
signor to perform the contract.,,1 
V. Damages 
In a matter of first impression in California, Lemat Corp. 
v. Barri dealt with the remedy of the owner of the San Fran-
cisco Warriors, a profession basketball team franchised by the 
National Basketball Association, in an action against one of 
its players for breach of his employment contract. The con-
tract was a standard form agreement in which Rick Barry 
agreed to play exclusively for the Warriors for the 1966-67 
season, and also granted to Lemat the option to renew for 
18. 268 Cal. App.2d 818, 74 Cal. 1. 267 Cal. App.2d 931, 937, 73 Cal. 
Rptr. 325 (1969). Rptr. 618, 622. 
19. 268 Cal. App.2d 818, 822, 74 
Cal. Rptr. 325, 328. 
20. 267 Cal. App.2d 931, 73 Cal. 
Rptr. 618 (1968). 
482 
2. 275 Cal. App.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 
240 (1969). For further discussion of 
this case, see York, REMEDIES, in this 
volume. 
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the 1967-68 season. Lemat exercised its option, but Barry 
entered into an agreement with the owner of the Oakland 
Oaks, franchised by the American Basketball Association, to 
play for the Oaks during the 1967-68 season. The Oaks' 
owners agreed to indemnify Barry against any liabilities in-
curred by him as a result of his contract with the Oaks. 
In Lemat's pleadings and the pretrial order, it was clear that 
the prayer was for an injunction to prevent Barry from play-
ing for the Oaks or in the alternative damages for loss of gate 
receipts. However, during the trial, Lemat asked for an in-
junction to protect Lemat from further damage which would 
result if Barry were allowed to play for the Oaks, and for 
damages for loss of gate receipts resulting from its loss of the 
right to display Barry, a player of "special, unique, unusual 
and extraordinary character." The trial court found the mat-
ter of damages properly before it and made a finding as to the 
amount of damages but granted relief only in the form of 
an injunction against Barry's playing for the Oaks during the 
1967-68 season. 
The reviewing Court struck the finding of damages as sur-
plusage and affirmed the trial court's position that Lemat was 
not entitled to both injunctive relief and damages.s The opin-
ion appears to take the position that damages in addition to an 
injunction would give duplicate relief. While this may well 
be true in some situations4 it appears to be a nonsequitur in 
the case of an athlete or performer. An injunction might min-
imize the loss, but it does not eliminate it unless the effect is 
to induce the individual to fulfill his contract. The force of 
the Court's position on this issue is weakened by the fact the 
3. But see Harvey v. White, 213 Cal. 
App.2d 275, 28 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1963), 
which involved the sale of an account-
ing services business in which the seller 
covenanted to refrain from competing 
in that area for 5 years. On breach, 
the Court held: "If, without excuse, 
appellants violated the covenant not to 
compete, respondents were entitled to 
the injunction they sued for and were 
further entitled to such damages as they 
CAL LAW 1970 
might have suffered by reason of that 
violation. . . . [I]t was incumbent 
upon the trial court to proceed further, 
to find the damages suffered by the 
breach of the covenant not to compete, 
and to enter judgment accordingly." 
4. In the typical situation of a breach 
or threatened breach of a negative cove-
nant, e.g., a covenant not to compete, 
the granting of injunctive relief would 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1970
Contracts 
opinion gives two alternative bases for the result. It states: 
"Lemat's claim for damages could acquire significance only if 
its request for injunctive relief was denied or was found to be 
inappropriate under the circumstances."5 The Court also 
stated, citing Central New York Basketball, Inc. v. Barnett6 
as authority, that "damages in a situation of this kind are 
speculative and uncertain and practically impossible to ascer-
tain."7 
The case does not appear to have brought any measurable 
degree of understanding or clarification to a difficult area of 
law. 
VI. Measure of Damages 
A salaried individual quits his job to buy a franchise and 
go into business. When the franchisor breaches the contract, 
there is no basis for proving loss of profits as an element of 
damages because the operation is not yet an established 
business with a history of earnings. Prospective profits are too 
speculative to be compensable. 8 In Runyan v. Pacific Air In-
dustries, Inc.,9 the trial court included as an item of damages 
the amount of wages which the plaintiff would have earned 
at his former job which he quit to obtain a photogrammetric 
franchise from defendants. The Court of Appeal held this 
to be improper noting that the franchise was not an employ-
ment contract, and that the parties in no way contemplated 
that plaintiff would receive any compensation in the nature 
of a salary. "The two considerations are entirely separate, 
5. Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. 
App.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969). 
But compare Code of Civ. Proc. § 580. 
"The relief granted to the plaintiff, if 
there be no answer, cannot exceed that 
which he shall have demanded in his 
complaint; but in any other case, the 
court may grant him any relief consist-
ent with the case made by the com-
plaint and embraced within the issue." 
6. 88 Ohio L. Abs. 40, 19 Ohio Ops. 
2d 130, 181 N.E.2d 506 (1961). 
484 
7. Lemat Corp. v. Barry, 275 Cal. 
App.2d -, 80 Cal. Rptr. 240. 
8. Overstreet v. Merritt, 186 Cal. 
494, 200 P. 11 (1921). 
9. 271 Cal. App.2d -,76 Cal. Rptr. 
701 (1969). This case was granted a 
hearing before the California Supreme 
Court. As this volume goes to press, 
the result of the appeal based on the 
issue of lost wages is still being awaited. 
For further discussion of this case, see 
York, REMEDIES, in this volume. 
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salary on the one hand and entrepreneurial activity on the 
other, and there is nothing to justify an award of the equiv-
alent of salary to plaintiff."lo 
The reversal appears to have been arbitrary. Where a 
contract breach involves a new enterprise, the profits of which 
cannot be shown with adequate certainty, California cases 
have allowed plaintiffs to recover the cost of preparing to 
carry out the contract. This has been held to include the 
earnings which plaintiff would have received from his former 
business had he continued to pursue it. ll It would not appear 
improper to have held that it also includes the earnings which 
plaintiff would have received in his former employment. 
VII. Implied Contracts-Unordered Goods 
The addition of sections 1584.5 and 1584.6 to the Civil 
Code brings relief to recipients of unwanted merchandise.12 
10. Runyan v. Pacific Air Industries, 
Inc., 271 Cal. App.2d -, -, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 703. 
11. Overstreet v. Merritt, 186 Cal. 
494, 200 P. 11 (1921). 
12. Section 1584.5, added to the Civ-
il Code in 1969, reads: "1584.5. No 
person, firm, partnership, association or 
corporation, or agent or employee there-
of, shall, in any manner, or by any 
means, offer for sale goods, wares, or 
merchandise, where the offer includes 
the voluntary and unsolicited sending 
of such goods, wares, or merchandise 
not actually ordered or requested by 
the recipient, either orally or in writing. 
The receipt of any such goods, wares, 
or merchandise shall for all purposes be 
deemed an unconditional gift to the re-
cipient who may use or dispose of such 
goods, wares, or merchandise in any 
manner he sees fit without any obliga-
tion on his part to the sender. 
"If after any such receipt deemed to 
be an unconditional gift under this sec-
tion, the sender continues to send bill 
statements or requests for payment 
CAL LAW 1970 
with respect thereto, an action may be 
brought by the recipient to enjoin such 
conduct, in which action there may also 
be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees 
and costs to the prevailing party." 
(Emphasis added) 
"Section 2. Section 1584.6 is added 
to the Civ. Code, to read: 
"1584.6. If a person is a member of 
an organization which makes retail 
sales of any goods, wares, or merchan-
dise to its members, and the person no-
tifies the organization of his termina-
tion of membership by certified mail, 
return receipt requested, any unordered 
goods, wares, or merchandise which are 
sent to the person after 30 days follow-
ing execution of the return receipt for 
the certified letter by the organization, 
shall for all purposes be deemed un-
conditional gifts to the person, who may 
use or dispose of the goods, wares, or 
merchandise in any manner he sees fit 
without any obligation on his part to 
the organization. 
"If the termination of a person's mem-
bership in such organization breaches 
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It is apparent that the scope of section 1584.5 is not so broad 
as to include all unordered goods, but will apply where the 
sending is done voluntarily and for the purpose of offering 
them for sale to the recipient. The provision for attorneys' 
fees and costs to the prevailing party should be welcomed by 
the harassed consumer, but it is far short of the earlier stat-
ute13 on the same subject, which would have provided for 
"exemplary damages and costs incurred by the recipient" but 
which was apparently superseded by the later enactment of 
Chapter 400. 
VIII. Performance-Sufficiency 
U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Vadnais14 involved complex ques-
tions of burden of proof of substantial performance. Plaintiff 
nothing in this section shall relieve the 
person from liability for damages to 
which he might be otherwise subjected 
to pursuant to law, but he shall not be 
subject to any damages with respect to 
any goods, wares, or merchandise which 
are deemed unconditional gifts to him 
under this section. 
"If after any receipt deemed to be 
an unconditional gift under this section, 
the sender continues to send bill state-
ments or requests for payment with re-
spect thereto, an action may be brought 
by the recipient to enjoin such conduct, 
in which action there may also be 
awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and 
costs to the prevailing party." 
13. It is unclear which of the two 
additions of Section 1584.5 to the Civil 
Code, enacted in 1969, represents the 
intent of the legislature. Assembly Bill 
77, filed July 8, 1969 calls for the rem-
edy quoted in the last footnote. 
Hereafter appears Senate Bill 323 
filed June 27, 1969, also purporting to 
be "an act to add Section 1584.5 to the 
Civil Code," enacted into law. 
1969 Stats. Ch. 265: 
Section 1. Section 1584.5 is added 
to the Civil Code to read: 
4·86 
"1584.5. No person, firm, partner-
ship, association or corporation, or 
agent or employee thereof, shall, in 
any manner, or by any means, offer for 
sale goods, wares or merchandise where 
the offer includes the voluntary and 
unsolicited sending of such goods, wares 
or merchandise not actually ordered or 
requested by the recipient, either orally 
or in writing. The receipt of any such 
goods, wares, or merchandise shall for 
all purposes be deemed an uncondi-
tional gift to the recipient who may use 
or dispose of such goods, wares or mer-
chandise in any manner he sees fit with-
out any obligation on his part to the 
sender. 
"If after any such receipt deemed to 
be an unconditional gift under this sec-
tion, the sender continues to send bill 
statements or requests for payment with 
respect thereto, an action may be 
brought by the recipient to enjoin such 
conduct, in which action there may also 
be judgment for exemplary damages 
and costs incurred by the recipient." 
(Emphasis added.) 
14. 270 Cal. App.2d 520, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 44 (1969). 
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contracted to manufacture and deliver over $400,000 worth 
of pipe to defendant's construction job. The pipe was all 
eventually delivered, but deliveries were very late, apparently 
due to plaintiff's efforts to obtain specification changes before 
commencing manufacture. Defendant buyer paid over $300,-
000, but withheld approximately $100,000 as a setoff for 
liabilities incurred as the result of defendant's delay. 
Plaintiff sued for the balance due on the contract and de-
fendant cross complained for damages arising from plaintiff's 
breach. Neither plaintiff nor defendant introduced any evi-
dence as to the amount of damages caused by plaintiff's delay, 
although it was apparent from various facts that some damages 
had been sustained. The court gave judgment for defendant 
on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to substantially per-
form the contract and gave judgment for the plaintiff (cross 
'defendant) on the cross complaint on the grounds that there 
was no proof of the amount of damages which the defendant 
sustained. Both j~dgments were appealed and both reversed. 
Quoting from Lowy v. United Pac. Ins. CO.15 the reviewing 
Court in U.S. Industries, Inc. v. Vadnais concluded that sub-
stantial performance had occurred and the defendant became 
obligated to pay the contract price less damages sustained un-
less there was a ". . . combination of these two factors: 
( 1) substantial omissions or deviations resulting from (2) wil-
ful or intentional action (or inaction) on the part of the party 
claiming that he substantially performed.,,16 Since there was 
no evidence submitted concerning the extent of the damage 
caused by plaintiff's delay, the Court stated: "The question 
then is: Who has the burden of proving such damages?"17 
It was concluded that the burden lay on the defendant. 
As applied in this case, the allocation of the burden of proof 
does not appear objectionable. Applied to a construction con-
tract, however, it appears to indicate that, having proved per-
formance that roughly approximates what was agreed on, the 
15. 67 Cal.2d 87, 60 Cal. Rptr. 225, 17. 270 Cal. App.2d 520, 527, 76 
429 P.2d 577 (1967). Cal. Rptr. 44, 48. 
16. 270 Cal. App.2d 520, 530, 76 
Cal. Rptr. 44, 51. 
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contractor may retire to watch the owner prove the dollar 
value of the breaches. Failure to develop the required cer-
tainty of damages will result in the owner's paying the full 
contract price. It would not appear unjust to include within 
the plaintiff's burden of proof of substantial performance proof 
of the dollar value of his derelictions. 
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